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 1 Introduction
What are the e⁄ects of changes in government purchases of goods and services (hence-
forth, government spending, for short) on aggregate economic activity? How are those
e⁄ects transmitted? Even though such questions are central to macroeconomics and
its ability to inform economic policy, there is no widespread agreement on their an-
swer, either at the empirical or at the theoretical levels.
In particular, though most macroeconomic models predict that a rise in govern-
ment spending will have an expansionary e⁄ect on output, those models often di⁄er
regarding the implied e⁄ects of such a policy intervention on consumption. Since the
latter variable is the largest component of aggregate demand, its response is a key
determinant of the size of the government spending multiplier. In that regard, the
textbook IS-LM model and the standard RBC model provide a stark example of such
di⁄erential qualitative predictions.
Thus, while the standard RBC model generally predicts a decline in consumption
in response to a rise in government spending, the IS-LM model predicts an increase
in the same variable, hence amplifying the e⁄ects of the expansion in government
spending on output. Of course, the reason for the di⁄erential impact across those
two models lies in how consumers are assumed to behave in each case. The RBC
model features an in￿nitely-lived household, whose consumption decisions at any
point in time are based on an intertemporal budget contraint. Ceteris paribus, an
increase in government spending lowers the present value of after-tax income, thus
generating a negative wealth e⁄ect that induces a cut in consumption.1 In the IS-LM
model consumers behave in a non-Ricardian fashion, with their consumption being
1The mechanisms underlying those e⁄ects are described in detail in Aiyagari et al. (1990), Baxter
and King (1993), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), and FatÆs and Mihov (2001), among others.
In a nutshell, an increase in (non-productive) government purchases (￿nanced by current or future
lump-sum taxes) has a negative wealth e⁄ect which is re￿ ected in lower consumption. It also induces
a rise in the quantity of labor supplied at any given wage. The latter e⁄ect leads, in equilibrium,
to a lower real wage, higher employment and higher output. The increase in employment leads, if
su¢ ciently persistent, to a rise in the expected return to capital, and may trigger a rise in investment.
In the latter case the size of the multiplier is greater or less than one, depending on parameter values.
7a function of their current disposable income and not of their lifetime resources.
Accordingly, the implied e⁄ect of an increase in government spending will depend
critically on how the latter is ￿nanced, with the multiplier increasing with the extent
of de￿cit ￿nancing.2
What does the existing empirical evidence say regarding the consumption e⁄ects
of changes in government purchases? Can it help discriminate between the two para-
digms mentioned above, on the grounds of the observed response of consumption? A
number of recent empirical papers shed some light on those questions. They all apply
multivariate time series methods in order to estimate the responses of consumption
and a number of other variables to an exogenous increase in government spending.
They di⁄er, however, on the assumptions made in order to identify the exogenous
component of that variable. In Section 2 we describe in some detail the ￿ndings
from that literature that are most relevant to our purposes, and provide some addi-
tional empirical results of our own. In particular, and like several other authors that
preceded us, we ￿nd that a government spending leads to a signi￿cant increase in
consumption, while investment either falls or does not respond signi￿cantly. Thus,
our evidence seems to be consistent with the predictions of IS-LM type models, and
hard to reconcile with those of the neoclassical paradigm.
After reviewing the evidence, we turn to our paper￿ s main contribution: the devel-
opment of a simple dynamic general equilibrium model that can potentially account
for that evidence. Our framework shares many ingredients with recent dynamic opti-
mizing sticky price models,3 though we modify the latter by allowing for the presence
2See, e.g., Blanchard (2001). The total e⁄ect on output will also depend on the investment
response. Under the assumption of a constant money supply, generally maintained in textbook
versions of that model, the rise in consumption is accompanied by an investment decline (resulting
from a higher interest rate). If instead the central bank holds the interest rate steady in the face
of the increase in government spending, the implied e⁄ect on investment is nil. However, any
￿intermediate￿response of the central bank (i.e., one that does not imply full accommodation of
the higher money demand induced by the rise in output) will also induce a fall in investment in the
IS-LM model.
3See, e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), or Woodford
(2001).
8of rule-of-thumb consumers (who do not borrow or save, consuming their wage in-
stead), in coexistence with conventional in￿nite-horizon Ricardian consumers. The
presence of rule-of-thumb consumers is motivated, among other considerations, by
existing evidence on the failure of consumption smoothing in the face of income
￿ uctuations (e.g., Campbell and Mankiw (1989)) or the the fact that a signi￿cant
fraction of households have near-zero net worth (e.g., Wol⁄ (1998)). On the basis of
that evidence, Mankiw (2000) calls for the introduction of rule-of-thumb households
in macroeconomic models, and for an examination of the policy implications of their
presence.
The analysis of the properties of our model economy suggests that whether an
increase in government spending raises or lowers consumption depends on the inter-
action of a number of factors. In particular, we show that the coexistence of sticky
prices and rule-of-thumb consumers is a necessary condition for an increase in gov-
ernment spending to raise aggregate consumption. More interestingly, we show that
for empirically plausible calibrations of the fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers, the
degree of price stickiness, and the extent of de￿cit ￿nancing, out model predicts re-
sponses of aggregate consumption and other variables that are in line with the existing
evidence.4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the evidence in
the literature and provides some new estimates. Section 3 lays out the model. Section
3 contains an analysis of the model￿ s equilibrium dynamics. Section 4. examines the
equilibrium response to a government spending shock under alternative calibrations,
and with a special emphasis on the response of consumption and its consistency with
the existing evidence. Section 5 summarizes the main ￿ndings of the paper and points
to potential extensions and directions for further research.
4Ramey and Shapiro (1998) provide an alternative potential explanation of the comovements of
consumption and real wages in response to a change in military spending. Their analysis is based on
a two-sector model with costly capital reallocation across sectors, and in which military expenditures
are concentrated in one of the two sectors (manufacturing).
92 The Evidence
In the present section we summarize the existing evidence on the responses of con-
sumption, investment and other variables to an exogenous increase in government
spending, and provide some new evidence of our own. Most of the existing evidence
relies on structural vector autoregressive models, with di⁄erent papers using alterna-
tive identi￿cation schemes.
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and FatÆs and Mihov (2001) identify exogenous
shocks to government spending by assuming that the latter variable is predetermined
relative to the other variables included in their VAR. Their most relevant ￿ndings
for our purposes can be summarized as follows. First, a positive shock to govern-
ment spending leads to a persistent rise in that variable. Second, the implied ￿scal
expansion generates a positive response in output, with the implied multiplier being
greater than one in FatÆs and Mihov (2001), but close to one in Blanchard and Per-
otti (2002). Third, in both papers the ￿scal expansion leads to large (and signi￿cant)
increases in consumption. Fourth, the response of investment to the spending shock
is found to be insigni￿cant in FatÆs and Mihov (2001), but negative (and signi￿-
cant) in Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Perotti (2002) extends the methodology of
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) to data for the U.K., Germany, Canada and Australia,
with ￿ndings qualitatively similar to the ones obtained for the U.S. regarding the re-
sponse of consumption (positive) and investment (negative) to an exogenous increase
in government spending.
In related work, Mountford and Uhlig (2002) apply the agnostic identi￿cation
procedure originally proposed in Uhlig (1997) (based on sign and near-zero restrictions
on impulse responses) to identify and estimate the e⁄ects of a ￿balanced budget￿and
a ￿de￿cit spending￿ shock. As in Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Mountford and
Uhlig (2002) ￿nd that government spending shocks crowd out both residential and
non-residential investment, but do not reduce consumption.
10Overall, we view the evidence discussed above as tending to favor the predictions
of the Keynesian model, over those of the Neoclassical model (though see below for
discrepant results based on alternative identi￿cation schemes). In order to assess the
robustness of the above ￿ndings and the behavior of alternative variables of interest,
here we provide some complementary evidence using the same identi￿cation strategy
as Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and FatÆs and Mihov (2001). We use quarterly U.S.
data over the period 1954:I-1998:IV, drawn from the DRI database. Our baseline
VAR includes government purchases (federal, state and local, GGFEQ+GGSEQ),
output (GDPQ), hours (LPMHU), real interest rates -computed as the nominal rate
(FYGM) minus current in￿ ation based on the GDP de￿ ator (GDPD)- and a ￿fth
changing variable. For the latter we consider, in turn, consumption of nondurable
and services (GCNQ+GCSQ), the real wage (LBCPU/GDPD) and non-residential
investment (NRIPDC1). Moreover, in order to study the induced response of other
￿scal variables we also examine the responses of (end-of-period) real public debt,
taxes net of tranfers (GGFR+GGSR-GGAID-GGFTP-GGST+GGSDIV), and the
(primary) budget de￿cit. All quantity variables are in log levels, and normalized by
the size of the population of working age (P16). We included four lags of each variable
in the VAR.
Figure 1 displays our main ￿ndings. Total government spending rises signi￿cantly
and persistently, with a half-life of about two years. Consumption rises on impact
and remains signi￿cantly above zero for more than four years. By contrast investment
falls slightly and its e⁄ect dies quite rapidly.5 Notice that under this identi￿cation
the maximum e⁄ects of output and its demand components occur four to ten quarters
after the shock.
The government spending multiplier on output resulting from an exogenous shock
to total government spending is 0.7 at the end of the ￿rst year and 1.3 after eight
quarters. Thus, our estimated multiplier e⁄ects are of a magnitude similar to the
5This result is in line with the recent cross-country evidence presented by Alesina, Ardagna and
Schiantarelli (2002).
11ones reported by Blanchard and Perotti (2002).6 The sign and magnitude of these
estimated VAR output responses are also consistent with the range of estimated short-
run expenditure multipliers obtained using a variety of macroeconometric models.7
With respect to the labor variables, both hours worked and real wages appear
to rise signi￿cantly during the ￿rst four quarters, following a hump-shaped pattern
Moreover, and given the response of labor productivity, the rise in real wages is not
enough to generate a delayed fall in the price markup, followed by a subsequent recov-
ery into positive territory. A signi￿cant rise on real wages in response to a spending
shock was also found in Fatas and Mihov (2001) when measured as compensation per
hour in the non-farm business sector.
Finally, the bottom panels of Figure 1 show the response of taxes and the primary
de￿cit. The rise in government spending causes a positive but (largely) delayed
response in taxes. Accordingly, the de￿cit rises signi￿cantly on impact, and vanishes
only after three years. Similarly, the public debt (not shown) rises slowly and starts
to decrease after two years. The previous estimated responses of the ￿scal variables
will be used below to calibrate the ￿scal policy rule in our model economy.
Qualitatively, the above results are robust to the use of military spending (in-
stead of total government purchases) as a predetermined variable in the VAR, as in
Rotemberg and Woodford (1992).
It is worth emphasizing that the ￿ndings discussed above should be interpreted as
referring to the response to ￿regular￿or ordinary changes in government spending.
Other authors have focused on the economy￿ s response to changes in ￿scal policy
occurring in extra-ordinary episodes, like wars or other military buil-up episodes or
periods of massive ￿scal consolidations triggered by explosive debt dynamics.
The evidence for such episodes di⁄ers, in some dimensions, from the one based on
conventional VARs presented above. This appears to be the case for the literature
6We compute the (level) multiplier as the product of the estimated elasticity (or log multiplier)
with the average GDP/government spending ratio (which is roughly 5 in our sample).
7See Hemming, Kell and Mahfouz (2002).
12that relies on the dummy variable proposed by Ramey and Shapiro (1998) to date
the beginning of military build-up episodes as a measure of exogenous government
spending . Using that approach, Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) show that
a Ramey-Shapiro episode triggers a fall in real wages, an increase in non-residential
investment, and a (mild and delayed) fall in the consumption of nondurables and ser-
vices, though durables consumption increases on impact. More recent work by Burn-
side, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2003) using a similar approach reports a ￿ at response
of aggregate consumption in the short run, followed by a small (and insigni￿cant) rise
in that variable several quarters after the Ramey-Shapiro episode is triggered.8
Another branch of the literature, exempli￿ed by the work of Giavazzi and Pagano
(1990), has uncovered the presence of non-Keynesian e⁄ects of large ￿scal consoli-
dations. In particular, Perotti (1999) ￿nds evidence of a negative comovement of
consumption and government spending during episodes of ￿scal consolidation (and
hence large spending cuts) in circumstances of ￿ ￿scal stress￿(de￿ned by unusually
high debt/GDP ratios), but e⁄ects of opposite sign (and hence consistent with our
evidence above) in ￿ normal￿times.
In light of that evidence, we view the model developed below as an attempt to ac-
count for the e⁄ects of government spending shocks in ￿normal￿times (using Perotti￿ s
terminology), as opposed to extraordinary episodes. Accordingly, we explore the con-
ditions under which a dynamic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities and
rule-of-thumb consumers can account for the positive comovement of consumption
and government purchases that arises, in normal times, in response to exogenous
variations in the latter variable.
8An analysis of the reasons behind the di⁄erences in the results based on the Ramey-Shapiro
dummy relative to the rest of the literature lies beyond the scope of the present paper.
133 A New Keynesian Model with Rule-of-Thumb
Consumers
The economy consists of two types households, a continuum of ￿rms producing di⁄er-
entiated intermediate goods, a perfectly competitive ￿nal goods ￿rm, a central bank
in charge of monetary policy, and a ￿scal authority. Next we describe the objectives
and constraints of the di⁄erent agents. Except for the presence of non-Ricardian con-
sumers, our framework consists of a standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model with staggered price setting ￿ la Calvo.9
3.1 Households
We assume a continuum of in￿nitely-lived households, indexed by i 2 [0;1]. A frac-
tion 1 ￿ ￿ of households have access to capital markets where they can trade a full
set of contingent securities, and buy and sell physical capital (which they accumulate
and rent out to ￿rms). We use the term (intertemporal) optimizing or Ricardian to
refer to that subset of households. The remaining fraction ￿ of households do not
own any assets or have any liabilities, and just consume their current labor income.
We refer to them as rule of thumb or non-Ricardian households. Di⁄erent interpre-
tations for the latter include myopia, lack of access to capital markets, fear of saving,
ignorance of intertemporal trading opportunities, etc. Campbell and Mankiw (1989)
provide some aggregate evidence, based on estimates of a modi￿ed Euler equation, of
the quantitative importance of such rule-of-thumb consumers in the U.S. and other
industrialized economies.
9Most of the recent monetary models with nominal rigidities abstract from capital accumulation.
A list of exceptions includes King and Watson (1996), Yun (1996), Dotsey (1999), Kim (2000) and
Dupor (2002). In our framework, the existence of a mechanism to smooth consumption over time is
critical for the distinction between Ricardian and non-Ricardian consumers to be meaningful, thus
justifying the need for introducing capital accumulation explicitly.
143.1.1 Ricardian Households
Let Co
t, and Lo
t represent consumption and leisure for optimizing/Ricardian house-
holds. Preferences are de￿ned by the discount factor ￿ 2 (0;1) and the period utility
U(Co
t;Lo
t). A typical household of this type seeks to maximize
E0
1 X
t=0
￿
t U(C
o
t;N
o
t ) (1)
subject to the sequence of budget constraints
Pt(C
o
t + I
o
t ) + R
￿1
t Bt+1 = WtN
o
t + R
k
tK
o
t + Bt + Dt ￿ PtTt (2)
and the capital accumulation equation
K
o
t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿) K
o
t + ￿
￿
Io
t
Ko
t
￿
K
o
t (3)
At the begining of the period the consumer receives labor income WtNo
t , where Wt
denotes the nominal wage, and No
t hours of work. He also receives income from renting
his capital holdings Ko
t to ￿rms at the (nominal) rental cost Rk
t. Bt is the quantity of
nominally riskless one-period bonds carried over from period t￿1, and paying one unit
of the numØraire in period t . Rt denotes the gross nominal return on bonds purchased
in period t. Dt are dividends from ownership of ￿rms, Tt denote lump-sum taxes
(or transfers, if negative) paid by these consumers. Co
t and Io
t denote, respectively,
consumption and investment expenditures, in real terms. Pt is the price of the ￿nal
good. Capital adjustment costs are introduced through the term ￿
￿
Io
t
Ko
t
￿
Ko
t, which
determines the change in the capital stock induced by investment spending Io
t . We
assume ￿
0 > 0, and ￿
00 ￿ 0, with ￿
0(￿) = 1, and ￿(￿) = ￿.
In what follows we specialize the period utility to take the form:
U(C;L) ￿ logC ￿
N1+’
1 + ’
where ’ ￿ 0.
15The ￿rst order conditions for the optimizing consumer￿ s problem can be written
as:
1 = Rt Et f￿t;t+1g (4)
PtQt = Et
￿
￿t;t+1
￿
R
k
t+1 + Pt+1Qt+1
￿
(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿t+1 ￿
￿
Io
t+1
Ko
t+1
￿
￿
0
t+1
￿￿￿
(5)
Qt =
1
￿
0
￿
Io
t
Ko
t
￿ (6)
where ￿t;t+k is the stochastic discount factor for nominal payo⁄s given by:
￿t;t+k ￿ ￿
k
￿
Co
t+k
Co
t
￿￿1 ￿
Pt
Pt+k
￿
(7)
and where Qt is the (real) shadow value of capital in place, i.e., Tobin￿ s Q. Notice
that, under our assumption on ￿, the elasticity of the investment-capital ratio with
respect to Q is given by ￿ 1
￿00(￿)￿ ￿ ￿:
Notice that we have not listed among the ￿rst order conditions an intratemporal
e¢ ciency condition linking the consumer￿ s marginal rate of substitution and the real
wage. The reason is that, as discussed below, hours are assumed to be determined
by ￿rms (instead of being chosen by households), given the prevailing wage. Since
the latter is assumed to remain above the marginal rate of substitution at all times,
households ￿nd it optimal to supply as much labor as it is demanded by ￿rms.
3.1.2 Rule-of-Thumb Households
Rule-of-thumb households do not borrow or save, possibly because of lack of access to
￿nancial markets or (continuously) binding borrowing constraints. As a results they
cannot smooth their consumption path in the face of ￿ uctuations in labor income
16or intertemporally substitute in response to changes in interest rates. Their period
utility is given by
U(C
r
t;L
r
t) (8)
and they are subject to the budget constraint:
PtC
r
t = WtN
r
t ￿ PtTt (9)
As it was the case for optimizing households, hours Nr
t are determined by ￿rms￿
labor demand, and are thus not chosen optimally by each household given the wage.10
Accordingly, the level of consumption will equate labor income net of taxes:
C
r
t =
Wt
Pt
N
r
t ￿ Tt (10)
3.1.3 The Wage Schedule
We do not model formally the details of the labor market. Instead we assume that
wages are determined according to the schedule
Wt
Pt
= H(Ct; Nt) (11)
where Ct and Nt function H is increasing in both arguments, capturing both con-
vex marginal disutility of labor and wealth e⁄ects. We interpret that function as a
generalized wage schedule consistent with a variety of models of wage determination.
Given the wage, each ￿rm decides how much labor to hire, and allocates its labor
demand uniformly across households, independently of their type. Accordingly, we
have Nr
t = No
t for all t .
We assume that the resulting wage markup is su¢ ciently high (and ￿ uctuations
su¢ ciently small) that the inequalities H(Ct;Nt) > C
j
t N
’
t for j = r;o are assumed
10Under a perfectly competitive labor market, hours and consumption of rule-of-thumb consumers
would move in opposite directions in response to movements in real wages, which we view as an
implausible prediction. This is not the case under our alternative framework, which allows for the
three variables to comove positively.
17to be satis￿ed at all times. Both conditions guarantee that both type of households
will be willing to meet ￿rms￿labor demand at the prevaling wage. Notice also that
consistency with balanced-growth requires that H can be written as Ct h(Nt), as we
assume below.
3.1.4 Aggregation
Aggregate consumption and hours are given by a weighted average of the correspond-
ing variables for each consumer type. Formally:
Ct ￿ ￿ C
r
t + (1 ￿ ￿) C
o
t (12)
Similarly, aggregate investment and capital stock are given by
It ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) I
o
t
and
Kt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) K
o
t
Finally,
Nt = ￿N
r
t + (1 ￿ ￿) N
o
t
= N
r
t = N
o
t
3.2 Firms
We assume a continuum of monopolistically competitive ￿rms producing di⁄erenti-
ated intermediate goods. The latter are used as inputs by a (perfectly competitive)
￿rm producing a single ￿nal good.
183.2.1 Final Goods Firm
The ￿nal good is produced by a representative, perfectly competitive ￿rm with a
constant returns technology:
Yt =
￿Z 1
0
Xt(j)
"￿1
" dj
￿ "
"￿1
where Xt(j) is the quantity of intermediate good j used as an input. Pro￿t maxi-
mization, taking as given the ￿nal goods price Pt and the prices for the intermediate
goods Pt(j), all j 2 [0;1], yields the set of demand schedules
Xt(j) =
￿
Pt(j)
Pt
￿￿"
Yt
as well as the zero pro￿t condition Pt =
￿R 1
0 Pt(j)1￿" dj
￿ 1
1￿"
.
3.2.2 Intermediate Goods Firm
The production function for a typical intermediate goods ￿rm (say, the one producing
good j) is given by:
Yt(j) = Kt(j)
￿ Nt(j)
1￿￿ (13)
where Kt(j) and Nt(j) represents the capital and labor services hired by ￿rm j.11Cost
minimization, taking the wage and the rental cost of capital as given, implies the
optimality condition:
Kt(j)
Nt(j)
=
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
Wt
Rk
t
￿
Real marginal cost is common to all ￿rms and given by:
MCt =
1
￿
￿
Rk
t
Pt
￿￿ ￿
Wt
Pt
￿1￿￿
where ￿ ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)1￿￿.
11Without loss of generality we have normalized the level of total factor productivity to unity.
19Price Setting. Intermediate ￿rms are assumed to set nominal prices in a staggered
fashion, according to the stochastic time dependent rule proposed by Calvo (1983).
Each ￿rm resets its price with probability 1￿￿ each period, independently of the time
elapsed since the last adjustment. Thus, each period a measure 1 ￿ ￿ of producers
reset their prices, while a fraction ￿ keep their prices unchanged.
A ￿rm resetting its price in period t will seek to maximize
max
P￿
t
Et
1 X
k=0
￿
k Et f￿t;t+k Yt+k(j) (P
￿
t ￿ Pt+k MCt+k)g
subject to the sequence of demand constraints Yt+k(j) = Xt+k(j) =
￿
P￿
t
Pt+k
￿￿"
Yt+k
and where P ￿
t represents the price chosen by ￿rms resetting prices at time t.
The ￿rst order condition for the above problem is:
1 X
k=0
￿
k Et
￿
￿t;t+k Yt+k(j)
￿
P
￿
t ￿
"
" ￿ 1
Pt+k MCt+k
￿￿
= 0 (14)
Finally, the equation describing the dynamics for the aggregate price level is given
by:
Pt =
￿
￿ P
1￿"
t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿) (P
￿
t )
1￿"￿ 1
1￿" (15)
3.3 Monetary Policy
In our baseline model the central bank is assumed to set the nominal interest rate
rt ￿ Rt ￿ 1 every period according to a simple linear interest rate rule:
rt = r + ￿￿ ￿t (16)
where ￿￿ ￿ 0 and r is the steady state nominal interest rate. An interest rate rule of
the form (16) is the simplest speci￿cation in which the conditions for indeterminacy
20and their connection to the Taylor principle can be analyzed. Notice that it is a
particular case of the celebrated Taylor rule (Taylor (1993)), corresponding to a zero
coe¢ cient on the output gap, and a zero in￿ ation target. Rule (16) is said to satisfy
the Taylor principle if and only if ￿￿ > 1. As is well known, in the absence of
rule-of-thumb consumers, that condition is necessary and su¢ cient to guarantee the
uniqueness of equilibrium.12
3.4 Fiscal Policy
The government budget constraint is
PtTt + R
￿1
t Bt+1 = Bt + Pt Gt (17)
Letting gt ￿ Gt￿G
Y , tt ￿ Tt￿T
Y , and bt ￿
Bt=Pt￿1￿(B=P)
Y , we assume a ￿scal policy
rule of the form
tt = ￿b bt + ￿g gt (18)
where ￿b and ￿g are positive constants. Finally, government purchases (in deviations
from steady state, and normalized by steady state GDP) evolve exogenously according
to a ￿rst order autoregressive process:
gt = ￿g gt￿1 + "t (19)
where 0 < ￿g < 1, and "t represents an i.i.d. government spending shock with
constant variance ￿2
".
3.5 Market Clearing
The clearing of factor and good markets requires that the following conditions are
satis￿ed for all t :
12The ￿Taylor principle￿refers to a property of interest rate rules for which an increase in in￿ ation
eventually leads to a more than one-for-one rise in the nominal interest rate (see Woodford (2001)).
21Nt =
Z 1
0
Nt(j) dj
Kt =
Z 1
0
Kt(j) dj
Yt(j) = Xt(j) for all j
and
Yt = Ct + It + Gt (20)
3.6 Linearized Equilibrium Conditions
Next we derive the log-linear versions of the key optimality and market clearing
conditions that will be used in our analysis of the model￿ s equilibrium dynamics. Some
of these conditions hold exactly, while others represent ￿rst-order approximations
around a zero-in￿ ation steady state. In general, we use lower case letters to denote
the logs of the corresponding original variables, (or their log deviations from steady
state).
3.6.1 Households
The log-linearized versions of the households￿optimality conditions, expressed in
terms of aggregate variables, are presented next.13 Many of these optimality condi-
tions turn out to be independent of ￿, the weight of rule-of-thumb consumers in the
economy.
The log-linear equations describing the dynamics of Tobin￿ s Q and its relationship
with investment are given respectively by
13See the Appendix for details.
22qt = ￿ Etfqt+1g + [1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)] Etf(r
k
t+1 ￿ pt+1)g ￿ (rt ￿ Etf￿t+1g) (21)
and
it ￿ kt = ￿ qt (22)
The log-linearized capital accumulation equation is:
kt+1 = ￿ it + (1 ￿ ￿) kt (23)
The log-linearized Euler equation for optimizing households is given by
c
o
t = Etfc
o
t+1g ￿ ￿o (rt ￿ Etf￿t+1g) (24)
where ￿o ￿ Co
C . Consumption for rule-of-thumb households is given, to a ￿rst order
approximation by
c
r
t =
￿
WN
PC
￿
[ct + (1 +  ) nt] ￿
￿
Y
C
￿
tt (25)
where cr
t ￿
Cr
t ￿Cr
C , and where we have made use of the log-linearized version of wage
schedule (11) consistent with balanced growth, i.e.:
wt ￿ pt = ct +   nt (26)
with   denoting the elasticity of wages with respect to hours, given consumption.14
Notice also that
ct = ￿ c
r
t + (1 ￿ ￿) c
o
t (27)
where co
t ￿
Co
t ￿Co
C . This aggregate relationship, combined with the previous equation,
yields the only aggregate equilibrium condition that is a⁄ected by the weight of rule-
of-thumb consumers, i.e. the log-linearized aggregate Euler equation, which takes the
form
14Notice that the case of pefect competition in labor markets (where real wages always equate the
marginal rate of substitution) corresponds to   = ’.
23ct = Etfct+1g ￿
1
e ￿
(rt ￿ Etf￿t+1g ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿n Etf￿nt+1g + ￿￿ Etf￿tt+1g (28)
where
e ￿ ￿
￿c ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
1 ￿ 1
"
￿
￿o￿c(1 ￿ ￿)
￿n =
￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 +  )
￿c
￿
"
"￿1
￿
￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿t =
￿(1 + ￿p)
￿c
￿
"
"￿1
￿
￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
with ￿c = C
Y being the share of consumption on output (which, as shown in the
Appendix, does not depend on ￿). Notice that lim￿!0 e ￿ = 1, lim￿!0 ￿n = 0, and
lim￿!0 ￿￿ = 0.
Two features of the above derivations are worth stressing. First, Euler equation
(28) is the only log-linear equilibrium condition involving aggregate variables which
depends on ￿: More precisely, the presence of rule-of-thumb households in￿ uences the
equilibrium dynamics through its e⁄ects on the coe¢ cient on expected employment
growth in the aggregate Euler equation. Second, even under non-distorsionary tax-
ation schemes, the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers imply that the consumption
equation depends upon taxes.
3.6.2 Firms
Log-linearization of (14) and (15) around the zero in￿ ation steady state yields the
familiar equation describing the dynamics of in￿ ation as a function of the deviations
of the average (log) markup from its steady state level
￿t = ￿ Etf￿t+1g ￿ ￿p ￿
p
t (29)
where ￿p =
(1￿￿￿)(1￿￿)
￿ and ignoring constant terms,
￿
p
t = (yt ￿ nt) ￿ (wt ￿ pt) (30)
24or, equivalently,
￿
p
t = (yt ￿ kt) ￿ (r
k
t ￿ pt) (31)
Furthermore, it can be shown that the following aggregate production function
holds, up to a ￿rst order approximation:
yt = (1 ￿ ￿)nt + ￿kt (32)
3.6.3 Market clearing
Log-linearization of the market clearing condition of the ￿nal good around the steady
state yields:
yt = ￿c ct + ￿i it + gt (33)
where ￿i ￿ I
Y represents the share of investment on output in the steady state.
3.6.4 Fiscal Policy
Linearization of the government budget constraint (17) around a steady state with
zero debt and a balanced primary budget yields
bt+1 = (1 + ￿) (bt + gt ￿ tt)
where ￿ ￿ ￿
￿1 ￿ 1 pins down the steady state interest rate. Plugging in the ￿scal
policy rule assumed above we obtain:
bt+1 = (1 + ￿) (1 ￿ ￿b) bt + (1 + ￿) (1 ￿ ￿g) gt (34)
Hence, under our assumptions, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for non-explosive
debt dynamics is given by
￿b >
￿
1 + ￿
254 Analysis of Equilibrium Dynamics
Combining all the equilibrium conditions involving aggregate variables and doing
some straightforward though tedious substitutions we can obtain a system of sto-
chastic di⁄erence equations describing the log-linearized equilibrium dynamics of our
model economy of the form
A Etfxt+1g = Bxt + "t (35)
where xt ￿ (nt; ct; ￿t; kt; bt; gt￿1)0. The elements of matrices A and B are all
functions of the underlying structural parameters, as shown in the Appendix. The
present section is devoted to the analysis of the determinacy of the model￿ s equilibrium
dynamics. We start by describing the calibration that we use as a benchmark.
Each period is assumed to correspond to a quarter. With regard to preference
parameters, we set the discount factor ￿ equal to 0:99. The elasticity of substitution
across intermediate goods, ", is set to 6, a value consistent with a steady state markup
￿p of 20 percent. The rate of depreciation ￿ is set to 0:025. Following King and Watson
(1996), ￿ (the elasticity of investment with respect to q) is equal to 1:0. The elasticity
of output with respect to capital, ￿, is assumed to be 1
3, a value roughly consistent
with income share given the assumed low steady state price markup. All the previous
parameters are kept at their baseline values throughout the present section. Next we
turn to the parameters for which we conduct some sensitivity analysis, distinguishing
between the non-policy and the policy parameters.
Our baseline setting for the weight of rule-of-thumb households ￿ is 1
2. This is
within the the range of estimated values in the literature of the weight of the rule-
of-thumb behavior (see Mankiw (2000)). The fraction of ￿rms that keep their prices
unchanged, ￿, is given a baseline value of 0:75, which corresponds to an average
price duration of one year. We set our baseline value for the elasticity of wages
with respect to hours ( ) to be equal to 0:2. This is consistent with Rotemberg and
26Woodford￿ s (1997, 1999) calibration of the elasticity of wages with respect to output
of 0:3 combined with an elasticity of output with respect to hours of 2
3.
Finally, the policy parameters are chosen as follows. We set the size of the re-
sponse of the monetary authority to in￿ ation, ￿￿, to 1:5, a value commonly used in
empirical Taylor rules (and one that satis￿es the so-called Taylor principle). For the
two parameters describing the ￿scal rule (18) we use the information provided by our
VAR analysis. In particular, we computed a historical decomposition of governtment
spending, taxes and debt due to the identi￿ed government spending shock. Then,
we use the exogenous variations due to these shocks in the variables to regress that
of taxes on government spending and debt. The corresponding estimated value for
￿g was 0:12 with standard error, 0:06; while the parameter for the response of taxes
to debt, ￿b, was 0:30 with standard error 0:06. The estimated value for ￿g is in line
with the evidence reported by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), while the estimated
parameter for ￿b is slightly higher than the (unconditional) estimate of Bohn (1998).
The steady state balanced primary budget is set to an average government spend-
ing share (sg) of 0:2 and ￿g, the autoregressive coe¢ cient in the government spending
process, is 0:9. These two latter values are also consistent with the U.S. evidence,
including the impulse response of government spending to its own shock shown in
Figure 1.
Much of the sensitivity analysis below focuses on the share of rule-of-thumb house-
holds (￿) and its interaction with parameters ￿, ￿,   and ￿￿. Given the importance
of the ￿scal rule parameters in the determination of aggregate consumption (and,
indirectly, of other variables) we will also analyze the e⁄ect of alternative values for
the policy parameters ￿b, ￿g, and ￿g.
274.1 Rule-of-Thumb Consumers, Indeterminacy, and the Tay-
lor Principle
Next we provide an analysis of the conditions that guarantee the uniqueness of equi-
librium. A more detailed analysis of those conditions for an economy similar to the
one considered here (though without a government sector) can be found in Gal￿,
L￿pez-Salido and VallØs (2003). There we show that the presence of rule-of-thumb
consumers can alter dramatically the equilibrium properties of an otherwise standard
dynamic sticky price economy. In particular, under certain parameter con￿gurations
the economy￿ s equilibrium may be indeterminate (and thus may display stationary
sunspot ￿ uctuations) even when the interest rate rule is one that satis￿es the Taylor
principle (which corresponds to ￿￿ > 1 in our model).
Figure 2 illustrates that phenomenon for the model developed in the previous
section under the baseline calibration. In particular the ￿gure displays the region
in the parameter space (￿, ￿) associated with a unique equilibrium and multiple
equilibrium, in a neighborhood of the steady state. We see that indeterminacy arises
whenever a high degree of price stickiness coexists with a su¢ ciently large weight of
rule-of-thumb households. Both frictions are thus seen to be necessary in order for
indeterminacy to emerge as a property of the equilibrium dynamics. As discussed by
Gal￿, L￿pez-Salido and VallØs (2003), that ￿nding holds irrespective of the assumed
values for the real wage elasticity   although the size of the uniqueness region shrinks
as   increase. The ￿gure also makes clear that the equilibrium is unique under our
baseline calibration (￿ = 1
2, ￿ = 0:75).
5 The E⁄ects of Government Spending Shocks
In the present section we analyze the e⁄ects of shocks to government spending in
the model economy described above. In particular, we focus on the conditions un-
der which an exogenous increase in government spending has a positive e⁄ect on
28consumption, as found in much of the existing evidence. Throughout we restrict
ourselves to calibrations for which the equilibrium is unique.
Figure 3 shows the contemporaneous response of output, consumption and invest-
ment (all normalized by steady state output) to a positive government spending shock,
as a function of the autoregressive coe¢ cient in the government spending process, ￿g.
The remaining parameters are kept at their baseline values. The ￿gure shows clearly
the possibility of crowding-in of consumption, i.e., an increase in consumption in re-
sponse to a rise in government spending. That crowding-in e⁄ect (and the consequent
enhancement of the multiplier) is decreasing in ￿g, since higher values of that para-
meter are associated with stronger (negative) wealth e⁄ects lowering consumption of
Ricardian households. Yet, we that even for values of ￿g higher than 0:9 a positive
(though relatively small) e⁄ect on aggregate consumption emerges. Notice also that
the response of investment to the same shock is negative over the whole admissible
range of ￿g although with values very close to unity (i.e., near-random walk processes
for government spending) that response becomes nill.
Figure 4 summarizes the impact multiplier under some alternative calibrations.
Each calibration assumes a limiting value for one (or two) parameters, while keeping
the rest at their baseline values. Thus, the ￿exible price scenario assumes ￿ = 0, the
no rule-of-thumb economy assumes ￿ = 0, the neoclassical calibration combines both
￿ exible prices and lack of rule-of-thumb consumers (￿ = ￿ = 0). Notice that when
prices are fully ￿ exible, or when all consumers are optimizing (or when both features
coexist, as under the neoclassical calibration) consumption is always crowded-out in
response to a rise in government spending, independently of the degree of persistence
of the latter. This illustrates the di¢ culty of reconciling the evidence with standard
dynamic general equilibrium models.
To complete the picture, Figure 5 displays the dynamic responses of output, its
three demand components, hours and real wages to a positive government spending
shock under the baseline calibration, and compares them to those generate by a
29neoclassical economy (￿ = ￿ = 0). Not surprisingly, the adjustment of the three
demand components and the output is monotonic, implying that the sign of the
conditional correlations can already be inferred from the impact responses shown
above. Futhermore, in the baseline model, and in contrast with the neoclassical
model, the increase in aggregate hours coexists with an increase in real wages. At
the end of the Figure we also display the response of taxes and de￿cit. Notice that
the patern of both variables is close to the one estimated in the data (Figure 1)
The graphs in Figure 6 summarize the sensitivity of the impact multipliers to
variations in four structural parameters ￿, ￿, ￿ and   to a one percent government
spending shock. In the upper left panel we observe that the impact response of
consumption and output are increasing in the share of rule-of-thumb consumers (￿),
whereas the response of investment is decreasing in the same parameter. Interestingly,
values of lambda higher than 0:3 lead to an increase in consumption, while investment
is slightly negative. In the upper right panel the degree of price stickiness is indexed
by parameter ￿. A key result seems to emerge: the size of the response of output and
its two components (consumption and investment), is increasing in the degree of price
rigidities. Again, values of ￿ slightly higher than 0:6 are consistent with a positive
response of aggregate consumption to an ingrease in governent spending. The two
lower panels show the impact multipliers when the degree of capital adjustment costs,
￿, and the real wage elasticity,   change. High capital adjustment costs (i.e., low ￿)
tend to damp investment ￿ uctuations, but enhance the response of consumption and
output. Finally, we notice the impact multipliers are not very sensitive to changes in
the elasticity of real wages with respect to hours (i.e.  ), provided that the rest of
the parameters are at their baseline values.
Figure 7 displays a similar set of graphs showing the impact response of output,
consumption and investment as a function of the three policy parameters (￿￿,￿g,
￿b). Qualitatively, the top panel appears as the mirror image to the one shown in
Figure 6 with the degree of price stickiness: the stronger the central bank￿ s response to
30in￿ ation (￿￿), the weaker is the impact of a government spending shock on output and
its components. That ￿nding may not be surprising since in staggered price setting
models of the sort analyzed here, the central bank can approximate arbitrarily well the
￿ exible price equilibrium allocation by following an interest rate rule that responds
with su¢ cient strength to in￿ ation. The middle and bottom panels in Figure 7 show
the sensibility of the multiplier e⁄ects to changes in the two ￿scal rule parameters. A
clear result emerges from these ￿gures. A positive comovement of consumption and
government spending requires a su¢ ciently high response of taxes to debt (high ￿b)
and a su¢ ciently low response of taxes to current government spending (i.e., low ￿g)
(and thus a larger increase in the budget de￿cit on impact).
6 Summary and Assessment of the Model
In the previous analysis we have shown how the interaction between the fraction of
rule-of-thumb households (whose consumption equals their labor income) and sticky
prices (modeled as in the recent New Keynesian literature) makes it possible to gen-
erate an increase in consumption in response to a persistent expansion in government
spending, in a way consistent with much of the recent evidence. Rule-of-thumb
consumers insulate part of aggregate consumption from the negative wealth e⁄ects
generated by the higher levels of (current and future) taxes needed to ￿nance the ￿s-
cal expansion, while making it more sensitive to current labor income (net of current
taxes). Sticky prices make it possible for real wages to increase, even if the mar-
ginal product of labor goes down, since the price markup may decline su¢ ciently to
more than o⁄set the latter e⁄ect. The increase in the real wage raises current labor
income and hence stimulates the consumption of rule-of-thumb households. That in-
tuition explains why both nominal rigidities and weight of rule-of-thumb consumers
are needed in order to obtain the desired procyclical response of consumption. Most
importantly, that result can be obtained with con￿gurations of parameter values
which are consistent with the exiting evidence and/or which conventionally assumed
31in the business cycle literature. Thus, we view our results as providing a potential
solution to the seeming con￿ ict between empirical evidence and the predictions of
existing DSGE models regarding the efects of government spending shocks.
Our theoretical analysis assumes that the increase in government spending is
￿nanced by means of lump-sum taxes (current or future). If only distortionary labor
and/or capital income taxes were available to the government, the response of the
di⁄erent macroeconomic variables to a government spending shock will generally di⁄er
from the one that obtains in the economy with lump-sum taxes analyzed above, and
will depend on the composition and timing of the taxation. We leave the analysis of
that case for future research.
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Steady State Analysis
The market clearing condition for ￿nal goods implies:
￿c = 1 ￿
I
Y
￿
G
Y
= 1 ￿
￿￿
￿
￿
Y
K
￿ ￿ ￿g
= (1 ￿ ￿g) ￿
￿￿
(￿ + ￿)(1 + ￿p)
where the last equality follows from the fact that in the steady state Rk
P = ￿
1+￿p
Y
K
(implied by the constant marginal cost) and Rk
P = (￿+￿) (implied by Q = 1). Notice
that this share of consumption on total output it is independent of the share of
rule-of-thumb consumers.
Below we make use of an expression for the steady state ratio of labor income
over consumption, WN
PC , which is given by
WN
PC
=
1 ￿ ￿
(1 + ￿p)￿c
Derivation of the Reduced Dynamical System
The equilibrium conditions describing the model dynamics are given by expres-
sions (26)-(34). Now we reduce those conditions to the ￿ve variable system (35) in
terms of hours, consumption, in￿ ation, capital and government spending.
The ￿rst equation in the system (35) corresponds to the linearized capital accu-
mulation equation (23), with it substituted out using market clearing condition (33)
and replacing yt subsequently using the production function (32):
kt+1 =
￿
1 ￿ ￿ +
￿￿
1 ￿ e ￿c
￿
kt +
￿(1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ e ￿c
nt ￿
￿ ￿c
1 ￿ e ￿c
ct ￿
￿
1 ￿ e ￿c
gt (36)
where e ￿c = ￿c+￿g. In order to derive the second equation in (35) we start by rewriting
the in￿ ation equation (29) in terms of variables contained in xt. Using (30) and (26)
33we obtain an expression for the marginal cost as a function of the consumption output
ratio and aggregate hours
￿t = yt ￿ ct ￿ (1 +  ) nt (37)
Substituting the previous expression (37) into (29), and making use of (32) yields
the second equation in (35)
￿t = ￿ Etf￿t+1g + ￿p [ct ￿ yt + (1 +  ) nt]
= ￿ Etf￿t+1g + ￿p ct ￿ ￿￿p kt + (￿ +  )￿p nt (38)
To obtain the aggregate consumption Euler equation we substitute expression (25)
into expression (27) which yields
ct = ￿
￿
WN
PC
￿
[ct + (1 +  ) nt] ￿ ￿
￿
Y
C
￿
tt + (1 ￿ ￿) c
o
t
=
￿ (1 +  )(1 ￿ ￿)
￿c (1 + ￿p) ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
nt ￿
￿ (1 + ￿p)
￿c (1 + ￿p) ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
tt +
￿c (1 + ￿p)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿c (1 + ￿p) ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
c
o
t
We can use the previous equation to substitute for co
t in (24) to obtain an Euler-like
equation for aggregate consumption:
ct = Etfct+1g ￿
￿o￿c (1 + ￿p)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿c (1 + ￿p) ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
(rt ￿ Etf￿t+1g)
￿
￿ (1 +  ) (1 ￿ ￿)
￿c (1 + ￿p) ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
Etf￿nt+1g
+
￿ (1 + ￿p)
￿c (1 + ￿p) ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
Etf￿tt+1g
or, more compactly,
ct = Etfct+1g ￿
1
e ￿
(rt ￿ Etf￿t+1g) ￿ ￿n Etf￿nt+1g + ￿t Etf￿tt+1g
where e ￿ =
￿
￿c(1+￿p) ￿ ￿(1￿￿)
￿o￿c(1￿￿)(1+￿p)
￿
, ￿n =
￿(1￿￿)(1+ )
￿c(1+￿p) ￿ ￿(1￿￿) and ￿t =
￿ (1+￿p)
￿c(1+￿p) ￿ ￿(1￿￿),
which are the coe¢ cients of expression (28) in the text.
34Plugging into the previous Euler equation the interest rate rule (16), the ￿scal
rule (18), and using the fact the the government spending follows a ￿rst order au-
toregressive process (19) we obtain the third equation in (35):
ct ￿ ￿n nt +
￿￿
e ￿
￿t = Etfct+1g +
1
e ￿
Etf￿t+1g ￿ ￿n Etfnt+1g (39)
+￿t￿b ￿bt+1 + ￿t￿g(￿g ￿ 1) gt
In order to derive the fourth equation we ￿rst combine (37) and (31) to obtain
rk
t ￿pt = ct￿kt+(1+ )nt. The latter expression and the interest rate rule (16), allows
us to rewrite the equations describing the dynamics of Tobin￿ s q and investment as
follows:
it ￿ kt = ￿ Etf(it+1 ￿ kt+1)g
+￿[1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)] [Etfct+1g ￿ kt+1 + (1 +  ) Etfnt+1g]
￿￿￿￿ ￿t + ￿ Etf￿t+1g
Finally, substituting the relationship
it ￿ kt =
￿
1
1 ￿ e ￿c
￿
[(1 ￿ ￿)nt ￿ ￿cct ￿ gt ￿ (1 ￿ e ￿c ￿ ￿)kt]
(which can be derived by combining the goods market clearing condition with the
production function) into the previous equation and rearranging terms we obtain the
fourth equation of our dynamical system
(1 ￿ ￿) nt ￿ ￿c ct ￿ (1 ￿ e ￿c ￿ ￿) kt + (1 ￿ e ￿c)￿￿￿ ￿t = [!(1 +  ) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)] Etfnt+1g
+(! ￿ ￿￿c) Etfct+1g
￿[! + ￿(1 ￿ e ￿c ￿ ￿)] kt+1
+(1 ￿ e ￿c)￿ Etf￿t+1g (40)
+(1 ￿ ￿￿g) gt
35where ! ￿ ￿[1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)](1 ￿ e ￿c) > 0:
The last two equations of the system correspond to expression (34) describing the
debt accumulation and the autoregressive process for government spending (19).
Hence the system of equations (36), (38), (39), (40), (34), and (19) can be written
in a matrix form as follows
A Etfxt+1g = B xt + "t
where xt ￿ [nt; ct; ￿t; kt; bt; gt￿1]0, and
A ￿ 2
6 6 6
6 6 6
4
0 0 0 1 0 ￿
1￿e ￿c
0 0 ￿ 0 0 0
￿￿n 1 1
e ￿ 0 ￿t￿b ￿t(￿g ￿ 1)￿g
!(1 +  ) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ! ￿ ￿￿c (1 ￿ e ￿c)￿ ￿[! + ￿(1 ￿ e ￿c ￿ ￿)] 0 (1 ￿ ￿￿g)
0 0 0 0 1 ￿(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿g)
0 0 0 0 0 1
3
7 7 7
7 7 7
5
B ￿
2
6 6 6
6 6 6 6
4
￿(1￿￿)
1￿e ￿c ￿
￿ ￿c
1￿e ￿c 0 1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿
1￿e ￿c 0 0
￿(￿ +  )￿p ￿￿p 1 ￿￿p 0 0
￿￿n 1
￿￿
￿ 0 ￿t￿b 0
1 ￿ ￿ ￿￿c (1 ￿ e ￿c)￿￿￿ e ￿c + ￿ ￿ 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 (1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿b) 0
0 0 0 0 0 ￿g
3
7 7 7
7 7 7 7
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40Figure 1. Responses to a Government Spending Shock 
Sample Period: 1954:1-1998:4
government spending
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
consumption
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.12
0.00
0.12
0.24
0.36
0.48
hours
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.18
-0.09
0.00
0.09
0.18
0.27
0.36
taxes
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
gdp
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
investment
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
real wages
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.06
0.00
0.06
0.12
0.18
0.24
deficit
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.6
0.0
0.6
1.2
1.8Figure 2. Determinacy Analysis 
Baseline Calibration 
indeterminacy
uniquenessFigure 3. Impact Multipliers: Sensitivity to Ug
Persistence of the Government Spending Shock ( Ug )
Consumptiono
mOutput
Investment
0 0.5 0.9 1
0.0
6.5Figure 4. Impact Multipliers: Sensitivity to Ug
Alternative Calibrations 
Flexible Prices
0 0.5 1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
No Rule-of-Thumb Consumers
0 0.5 1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Neoclassical
0 0.5 1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Persistence of Government Spending Shock ( Ug )
Consumptiono
mOutput
Investment
Baseline
0 0.5 1
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5Figure 5. Impulse Responses to a Government Spending Shock 
Neoclassical vs. Baseline Models
government spending
0 4 16 20
0
0.5
1
output
0 4 16 20
0
1
2
consumption
0 4 16 20
-0.5
0
0.5
1
investment
0 4 16 20
-0.1
0
0.1
Horizon
hours
0 4 16 20
0
1
2
3
Horizon
real wages
0 4 16 20
0
0.5
1
1.5
Horizon
taxes
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.5
1
deficit
0 5 10 15 20
-0.5
0
0.5
1
o-o-o baseline model 
-------- neoclassical model  
 
Figure 6. Impact Multipliers  
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 Figure 7.  Impact Multipliers 
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